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IN  TH.i:  UNITED  STJ\.'i'ES  ANl..l  THE  COMHUNITY 
The  Directorate-General  for Agriculture  has  just published a 
study entitled "Comparison of agricultural support  systems  in the 
Unitud States  and  the  Community"  in its series of  studies  on agricul-
ture  ("Internal  Information  on  Agriculture'',  No.  70,  January 1971). 
The  purpose  of this study  was  to  compare  aid arrangements  for 
agriculture  in the  United States with  those  applied in the  Comnunity 
to  determine,  in approximate  terms,  what  effect these  have  on  farm 
income  in  the countries  concerned. 
An  attempt  was  made  to  take all forms  of public  aid  into  account. 
It is not  enough  to  compare  public  expenditure  on  subsidies because 
the  additional  income  received by  farmers  is not  determined  by  direct 
public  aid alone  but also  by  policy on  land  tenure,  intervention 
affecting production costs,  regulation of production and  external 
trade. 
When  the  incidence  of support  was  being calculated,  only  those 
aids that have  a  direct influence  on  farm  income  in  the  Community  and 
the  United  States were  taken  irito  account.  The  question  to  be 
answered  was:  "To  what  extent  would  farm  income  declin.e  if these aids 
wero  wi thdravm?  11 
I. HETHODS  USED 
The  choice  of  methods  to.be  used  in making  the  calculations  was 
largely  detc~mincd by  the  presence  or  absence  of  econometric  models 
permitting  Q  dynamic  analysis of available statistics. 
This  led  to  agricultural  support in  the  United States  and  the 
Community  being assessed  by  two  essentially different methods.  This 
was  unavoidable  because  of differences  in  the  statistics available 
and  earlier econometric  studies  on  US  agriculture  by  American  research 
workers. 
1.  A dynamic  method  was  uned  for  the  United States.  Hith the  help 
of an  econometric  model  of  hmcrican  agri~ulture,  income  with  and 
without  internal measures  of  support  was  calculated.  For  the 
purposes  of  this model it was  assumed  that quantitative restric-
tions at  the  frontier  wera  retained.  The  model  does  not  make  it 
possible  therefore  to  assess  the  protective  effect of  thcce 
restrictions~  It docs  however  have  the  advantage  of  beine objec-
tive  in  that it isolates extraneous  elements  from  the  support 
system  t'.S  such. 
Moreover,  it is the  only possible  way  of assessing  global 
support  in  the  United States  which  is such  an  importent  producer 
of  many  commodities  at  world,  le~el that its production  and  domes-
tic prices  in~vitably ~ffect world prices.  For  this reason  the 
~ethod used  for  the  EEC  could  not  be  appl~ed to  the  Unite~ S~atcs. - 2  -
2.  A static method  was  used  for  the  EEC.  Support  was  calculated 
for  each product  sector  in a  way  that is very close  to  the  method 
advocated  during  the  Kennedy  Round  to  calculate  the  level of 
support,  To  determine  global  support,  the  levels calculated  for 
each  product sector were  added  together.  (The  average  levy  was 
generally regarded as representing  the  difference  between  internal 
and  world prices.)  Because  there  was  no  econometric  model  of 
European agriculture,  the  method  used  for  the  United States could 
not  be  applied  to  the  EEC. 
The  inevitable disparity between  the  two  methods  has  obvious 
drawbacks  which  become  very  evident  when  it comes  to  comparing  i~divi­
dual  sectors.  This  is particularly true  of  sectors  in which  US 
support  depends  heavily  on  quantitative restrictions  and  of  commodi-
ties  (meat  and  milk products,  for  instance),  of which it can  be  said 
that  US  production  has little or  no  influence  on  the  level of  world 
prices.  For  these  commodities  too  there  are  considerable  disparities 
between  the  level  of. support  given  by  tho  Community  and  by  the  Unit0d 
States which  do  not  always  give  a  true  picture of  the  ac~ual situation. 
It should  be  noted  that  these  disparities are offset in  the  global 
figures. 
It is important  to  boar  in mind  that  the  calculations are  based 
on  figures  for  1967.  When  work  on  the  study  began,  1967  was  thu 
last year  for  which sufficiently detailed statistics were  available 
for  the  Com~unity;  it was  also  the  year  used  by  American  research 
workers  in  their econometric  studies. 
II.  BRTSF  SURVEY  OF  TH~ IiWIDENCE  OF  PUBLIC  AID  ON  FARH  INCOHE  IN  THE 
U  IH'.i.'ED  STit'il<;S 1  ---- --------------· 
Table  I  eives  figures  for  farm  income  before  and  after  the  with-
drawal  of public  aid. 
Table  II gives absolute  figures  and  percentages  for  the  incidence 
of  individual aids  on  1967  income.  These  data  were  calculated  from 
Tabla  I,  following  a  re-arrangement  of certain headings. 
A plus  sign  (+)  in Table  II indicates  a  positive  effect on  farm 
income  and  implies  that if public  aid  were  withdrawn,  there  would  be 
a  corresponding reduction  in  farm  income. 
A minus  sign  (-)  in Table  II indicates  that  the  incidence  on 
certain values  of  the  withdrawal  of  aid  would  be  indirect and  tanta-
mount  to  an  increase  in  income·.  In  those  cases  total production 
costs  would  decline  following  a  decline  in the  volume  of  production  • 
.....-.----
1  Chapter  VI  of  the  study contains  a  detailed explanation of  tho 
calculation  techniques used  by  the  American  research  workers.  The 
findings  quoted  here  are largely based  on  the  work  of E.O.  Heady, 
L.V.  Heyer  and  H.c.  Hadsen~  A number  of  corrections  were  made  to 
hring  these  findings  m6re  into line with  the  sp~cific  ai~s of  ~he 
study. - 3  -
Since  the  withdrawal  of public  aid appeared  to  have  bot.h  a  posi-
tive  and  a  tiegdtivc  incidence  on  farm  income  in  the  United States; it 
proved  impossible  to  calculate the percentage  incidence of  individual 
aids  directly.  It would  in  fact  be  p0intless  to  conclude  that, 
because  aid  to  crop production  amounts  to  85  835  million and overall 
eid  to  $6  484  million,  90%  of  overall aid is grnnied  to  crop  growers. 
These  percentages have  therefore  been  calculated on  the  basis  of  total 
aid linked  to  production. 
Table  III shows  the  percentage  incidonce of aid in relation to 
the  value  of  the  constituent clements of  farm  income  prior  to  tho 
withdrawal  of public  aid. - 4 -
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Total  receipts from  livestock ! 
production  !  =+ 
vTheat  programma 
Food-grain procrammo 
Cotton  procrammo 
Sugar programme 
'\-Tool  programr:1o 
Miscellaneous 
Direct puolic  aid 
Total  receipts 
Total  cash oxpondituros 
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Farm  consumption +  intorost 
chargod +  stock appreciation 
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443 
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2  616 
1  746 
2  635 
18  383 
14  630 
5  770 
3  559 
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865 
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94 
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1  872 
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2  489 
15 159 
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J:::The  raoul ts for milk produets underestimate  tho real situation.  If tho 
incidonco  of  support is calculated via a  compariaon with world  market  prices, 
wo  got  $1  393  million for  tho  inoidonco  of  support  and  $4  377  million for 
notional  farm  income.  In this evant,  tho  incidonco  of  support  on  total 
:':"occipts  from  livestock productior. would  bo  ~-·$!).  151  million anr:  tho  corrospond-
ing figure for notional  farm  income  would  bo  $2~ 254  million.  Hot  income 
would  be  -$7  619  million  and  $7  025  million rospootivoly. !,·  .•  ,...:~  .· 
•· ..  ·~·-~-
- 18  -
p1nns  1-rill  have  been  submitted nnd  npproved by the  competent  authorities  .. ~~.} 
by the  end of 1976.  Of  this totn.l it is admitted that  320.000 pb.ns  will 
proba.b1y hn.vc  boon  completed by the und  of  1976  and thd 320.000 otbcrs 
will be  in hand at that. date.  It can be  cons:i.deNd1  therefore  1  that about 
480.000 plans will  have· been finished or nearing completion.  Tids aid is 
granted for the diration of the  development  plnn and for periods up  to six 
yea.rs. 
The  amount  of these  aids is: 
600  UA  for the first year? 
- 500  UA  for tho  second year; 
- 400  UA  for the third year; 
- 300  UA  for tho fourth year; 
- 200  UA  for tho fifth year; 
- 100  U.A.  for the  sixth year. 
Tho  total provisional cost of the  two  L10asures  has  ·ocen  estimated by 
the  Commission at  683  r.1illion  UA  for the first five years. 
Tho  Europcrm J,gricul  tural Guidance  and Guarantee Fund Hill  roiiiJburs·:J 
tho  Member  States 50  ~·~  of  the  "eligible" oxpondi turo. 
0  0 
0 
Errata 
1.  On  page  5  of  the  "Hevmlcttcr on  tho  Com:non  .A.gricul tural Policy
11  nr.  5  of 
May  1971 1  Tnble  II,  11/tbsolute  nnd rolati  ve  part  of  the  incidence  of support 
measures  on  the total incidence  on  revenues  in the  U11i ted Sta.tcs  :Ln  1967a  1 
under tho handing "Total  incidence  on  Revonuos"  in million  UA  road: 
11  +  6. 484  11  instead of  "  - 6.  484
11 
2.  In the  11Ncwslottor  on  the  Common  Agricultural Policy
11  nr.  7  of Juno  1971, 
in note  (1)  on  page  6  read 
1964  ¢  1963,1964,1965 
1968  ¢  1967,1968,1969. 
. 
t· 
.t. - 5  -
Tabla II - Incidonce  of  ou~nort on  faro  income  in tho Unitod States 
.  in.  19_6~  -·--
1n.£.i~i,S!u.,nl_m~~a.QU.£O£ i~_r_Ql.§tJo.n _t..q._oyo_r.a];l..:,.s,Y.:PJ20i:t_ 
i  million  .%  i  u.a. 
i  ·--- -+ 
il  Measures  linked to products  i  +  8 908  1')0  '  ~ 
I  i  i  (a)  Crcp  production  i  +  5 835  65.5  I 
I  i  i  llhoat  \+ 1  58">  17.7  I 
I  i 
i  Rico  i+  79  Oo9 
i.  i 
i  Food  crrain  :+  2  298  25.8 
i  l 
!  Sugar 
I  367  4.1  j+ 
I. 
Soya banns 
i 
i  j+ 1  257  14ol 
\ 
I 
i  Cotton  !+  7  0.1 
!  1 
Tobf.lCCO 
I  122  L4  :+ 
I 
vogotablos  i_  81  -0.,9 
\  Fruit  I+  60  0.7 
Miocollaneous  i 
146  i+  lo6 
I 
I 
(b)  Livostock production 
! 
i  +  3 073  34.5 
I  '  Boof  and veal,  pigmeat  ;+ 2 636  29o6 
i+  258!E 
!t 
H.I.::!.k:  and milk produoto  2o9 
F1ggs  and  poultrymoat 
! 
1 
i 
Wool  i+  57  0.6 
i 
Miscollanoous  i+  122  1.4 
i 
i 
2.  Reduction  in total :production  i 
- 2 200  '  I 
costs  (amortizations  included)  l 
: 
I 
duo  to  a  reduction in tccal  I 
i 
production  ! 
I 
i 
j. Various  inoidoncos  i  224  i 
! 
Overall incidonco  on  in  como  +  6 484  '  I  _,__ 
!I': 
Sao  rom ark under Table 
.,..  .... ·-G-
Table  III - _?erc~ntar._e  chnnr;e  in_ the  individual  elements  of  fnrm 
income  in  the  United  States folloEng  the  withdrawal 
of  ~upport (1967) 
\Wheat 
'  iRice 
I 
J :Feed  grain 
I 
'Sugar 
!Soya beans 
1 Cotton 
I 
; Tobacco 
I 
i Vegetables 
I 
i Fruit 
! 
!  J-lisc ellaneous 
: 
Tot~l receipts  frorn  crop 
production  +  effects of 
support  measures 
iBeef  and  veal,  pig~eat 
: Hilk and  milk products 
Eggs  and  poultrymeat 
Wool 
j 
! Miscell:meous 
I 
Total  receipts  from 
livestock production  + 
effects of  support  measures 
-56.5 
-17.8 
-50.0 
-79.6 
-51.6 
-o.4 
-8.8 
+  3·1 
-3.4 
-5.5 
-32.6 
-27.8 
-12.6 
1-- --4 
i Total  receipts 
l 
tTotal  cash  expenditures 
i 
I :~~<'lortiza tions 
!  Farm  consu1:1ption  +  interest  ~harged 
1 +  otock appreciation 
-19.4 
-6.2 
-6.8 
+6.2 
·----------------------------------------~------------------------------
· Net  income 
*rrndcrestination. 
prices is -21.1%. 
income. 
-44.3 
'Ihe  result  obtained  via  a  comparison  with  world 
This  would  give  a  reduction of 52%  in net 
I 
! 
l 
I 
i - 7 -
Table  IV  gives  fiBures  for  farm  income  before  and  after  the  w~th­
drnwal  of :public  nid;  it contains all entries in the  ESC's  agricul-
tural accounts. 
In the  first column  are  nggregate  values  taken  from  the  nntional 
agricultural accounts  of  the  six Member  States. 
Tho  tnble  gives  absolute  figures  and percentages  for  the  incidence 
of individual  measures  of  support  on  income.  A plus  sign  (+)  indi-
cates  a  positive effect on  farm  income,  and  farm  income  would  drop  by 
this  amount if support  were  withdrawn.  h  minus  sign  (-)  indicates 
thnt  the  in~idence on  the  values  in  question  of  the  withdrawal  of 
support  would  be  indirect  and  tantamount  to  an  increase in income. 
As  with  the  United States,  the  percentage  incidence  of individual 
measures  could  not  be  calculated directly and  for  the  same  reasons. 
These  percentages  have  therefore  been  calqulated in relation to  the 
total incidence  on  products rather than  the  global  incidence  of  support. 
In Table  VI,  the  percentage  variations  represent  the  relationship 
between  the  level of  support  and  the  value  of  the  constituent elements 
of  farm 'inc6me  before  the  abolition of  the relevant  measures. Table  IV - Actual  fare1  income  i~__!he  EEC  i~ 1q67  and_notional_ fflr~ 
income  ~allowing the  withdrawal  of stpport 
'':heat 
I~ic  e 
l<'eed  grain 
Sugar  beet 
Olive oil  ! 
Other 
Value  of final 
crop production 
; Beef and  veal 
Figmeat 
Hilk and  railk 
products  ' 
; :::.e;g.s  and 2:·oultrynDat 
Other 
Value  of  final 
livectock 
production 
j Hiscellaneous 
Total  value  of 
final ag.cicultural : 
production 
r 
immediate  : Overall 
! consumption 
i 
Subsidies 
Indirect  tax.es 
Amortizations 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+.,.  13  585 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+=  18  414 
+  394 
32  393 
10  853 
+  333 
472 
2  333 
A.ctual 
value i 
j 
2  466  i  . 
98! 
1  '185 
781 
437 
8  618: 
4  6o4; 
3  773 1 
6  218i 
; 
2  748~ 
1 071: 
-2 
\-7 
' 
(million u.a.) 
Incidence 
of aid 
(static) 
-1  163 
-17 
_ll-51 
-781 
-173 i 
'  '  . 
585  \11 
-1  781 
-871t ~ 
_It  I  01 Lt  ; 
~  -418! 
087  i 11 
Short-term 
notional 
value 
(without 
supl!Ort) 
1  303 
81 
734 
264 
8  618 
000 
2  823 
2  899 
2  204 
2  330 
1  071 
327 
391t 
\-9  672  ;22  721 
-55  ; 10  798 
333 
L'r(2 
2  i 
Net  product  at 
333 
-.....---~---------.----------! 
fc.ctor  C03t 
:;:  19  o68  '-9 617  9  451 
:r.1~dc~-("19 ,-668  =  1oo)·  100  .  -YJ. +  --~~9:6 
1'i.lhe--real-;;ffe~t-Ci~~the--~ff~~t if the  red~ti~-j_n :.:eed  ___  g_r_a_i_n_p_:i_~~-- ces 
2were-takcn  into  account) would  be  207  rr,illion u,a. 
The  2:ec..l  effect  would  be  137  million u.a. -· 9  -
'ruble V - ~.i.£_nce of  sup"Port  on  farm  inc  oa1e  in the  EEC  in 1967 
Individual measures  in relation to  overall support  ---------------------------------------------------
,1.  Heasures  linked to products 
(a)  Crop  production 
Wheat 
I  Rice 
I  Feed  t;rain 
I  Sugarbeet 
I 
i 
i 
Olive  oil 
I  (b}  Livestock production  I 
I  Beef  and veal 
1 
Pigment  i 
I 
I  lUll: and  mill-e  prodncts 
I  Eegs  and  poultrymoat 
I 
~  2.  Aida  linlced  to  inputs and 
income 
3.  Reduction  in cost  ~f imported 
t  feed  erain 
I 
l 
I 
I 
'  ! 
million u.a.  9~ 
9  672  100 
2 585  26.7 
1  163  12.0 
17  0.2 
451  lj.. 6 
781  8.1 
173  1.8 
7  087  73.3 
1  781  18 .Lt 
874  9.0 
4  014  lr 1. 6 
Lr18  4.3 
!-
539 
(-)  594 
~ 
1 
! - 10 -
Table  VI  - ~cnt~ee chan~in the  individ~al elements  of  fnrm 
inc.£l~e  in the  EEC  following  the  withdrawal  of  SUE.E.,£!t 
Wheat 
Rice 
Feed  e;rain 
Sugarbeet 
Olive  oil 
Yalue  of final crop production 
Beef  and  veal 
Picmeat 
~ilk and  milk  products 
Eggs  and  poultrymeat 
~aluo of final  livestock production 
'  ' 
I 
I 
i 
i 
'  I 
I 
'  I 
I 
'  I 
I 
'  I 
i 
I 
I  -19.0  j 
' 
... 38.5 
!  -47.2  { 
I 
I  -17.3 
I 
-38.1  i 
I  ,  -100  I 
-39.6 
i  -38.7  i 
j  1 
'  -23.2  I 
'  J  -64.6  i 
i  2 
i  -15.2 
i 
l 
i 
! 
~--------------------------------------------~----------~------------~ 
!Total value  of final agricultural 
(production 
:-------------· 
[ 
;overall intermediate  consumption 
[subsidies 
'  iindircct taxen 
I 
!Amortizations  , 
! 
i 
i -------·-----·----------
-29.9 
i 
i  +  0 .. 5 
i 
i  , 
I 
'  I 
i 
I 
i  , 
! 
-5o.L~  iNct  product  at  factor cost  !______________________________________  ------~------------------------
1  The  real effect  on  the  incone  of pig farmers,  allowing  for  the 
reduction in  the  cost  o~ feed,  iu  estimated at 207  million u.a. 
(5.5~).  Thio  figure  should be  compared  with  the  effect  on  the 
value  of final  production  (874  million uoa.  (23.2%)). 
2  The  same  is true for  pigment. 
The  real effect  on  income  amounts  to  137  nillion u.a.  (5%).  Tho 
effect  on  the  vulue  of  final  ~reduction is estimated at 418 
million u.a. - 11  -
The  findings  of  the  study should  be  interpreted with considerable 
caution.  It is true  thut  the  consid0rable  discrepancies 
(see  Tables  II and  VI  in pGrticular)  botw~on the  results obtained  f8r 
the Unitod  States  and  tho  EEC  illustrate a  fundamental  differ0nce  in 
appro~18h to  agriculturul policy,  but  they  co.n  also  be  attributt:;;d  to 
the  special  features  of  the  mcthcds  used  to  calculate  the  incidence  of 
public  aid in  the  two  economic  entities.  ~hen the  summ~ry tablds are 
being analysed  therefore,  the  results will need  to  be  elnboruted as 
Uwy  <:l!'c  being  intcrprc ted. 
l. General 
If public  aid  were  withdrawn,  the  value  of  final  wheat  production 
would  drop  appreciably  both  in the United States and  in  the  EEC  (56.5% 
and  47o276  respectively).  The  level of  support  given  to  the  wheat 
morket  in  the  United States appeo.:-s  however  to  exceed  that  given  in 
the  EEC:  17.7% of  total  produc t··linked support as  co:1parod  to  12.0% 
in the  EECo 
The  same  type  of  change  would  occur  for  feed  grain and  rice:  the 
value  of final production of  feed  grain  would  f~ll by  50.0%  in  tho 
United  States  and  38.1%  in the  E~C,  and  that of rice  by  17.8%  nnd  17.3%. 
lid to  feed  grain represents  25.8%  of  total product-linked  support 
in  the  United  States  Gnd  4.6%  in  tho  EEC.  The  corresponding figures 
for  rico  are  0.9%  and  0.2%. 
J'.part  from  wh0at,  rice and  feed  e;r<-Lin,  the  following  commodities 
receive  a  consideruble  ahar0  of  over~ll support  to  crop  production: 
in the  United  States,  soya benns  (14.1%  of all support  with  a  51.6% 
drop  in  the  value  of  productio11)  and  sugar  (4.1%  with  a  79.6%  drop  in 
thJ  value  of  production);  in  the  F~C,  sugar  (8.1%  of all support with 
a  100;,_;  clrop  in  the  V:J.luo  of  prod11ction)  and  olive oil  (1.8% with  n 
39~6% drop  in the  value  of production). 
The  overall results of  the  study  show  that  the  withdrawal  of all 
aupport  to  crop  production would  mean  that  the  value  of final  crop 
production  would  fall  by  27.8%  in  the  United States  nnd  by  19.0% in 
tho  E~C.  This  aid however  represents  a  much  hiBher proportion of all 
product-li:1kcd  o.id  in the  United  Stat€;S  than  in  the· BEC:  65~576 nnd 
26.7%  rGspGctively  of  the  ov8rall  incidence  of  support. 
Even  if the  percentage  were  the  same,  the  reduction  in  the  value 
of crop  production  would still represent  u  much  larger proportion of 
total product-linkoc1  support  in  the  United  l:)tates  thc,n  in the  :8BC, 
given  the  relatively low  level of  aid  to  livestock production in the 
United  Stntes.  Livestock producti,,n gets  almost  735b  of  tob.l 
p1.·oduc t·-linY.od  sup:port  in the  EEC,  as  ngain.st  35/b  in  the United 
States. - 12  -
The  relatively lower level of  su~port to  livestock production in 
the  United States is borne  out  hy  the  following: 
(n)  The  vulue  of  fin~l meat  production would  only fall  by  18%  in 
tho  medium  terrn if  sup~ort were  withdrawn,  ~s comparbd  to  a 
short-term reduction of  3Bo7%  fer  beef  and  venl  and  23.2%  for 
pigmoat1  in the  EEC; 
(b)  Milk  and  milk pr0ducts  deriva relatively little benefit  from 
moasures  of  support.  T~b value  of  production  would  only be 
reduced
2
by  4o5~ in  the  hypothesis  retained  by  Mayor,  Ho~dy and 
t1tld.snn,  <-W  CO!ilp.::u~od  to  a  fi[;ure  of  6Lt.6%  in  th·:J  EEC; 
(c)  Producer prices and  the  volume  of  egg  and  poultrymcat  prod~ction 
are  not  subject  to  control in the United States;  if support 
wero  withdrawn  in  the  EEC,  however,  the  value  of production  wouJ.d 
fall  by  l5.~7~o3 
Tho  other  findings  for  the United States  and  the  EEC  arc  mor·e  or 
loss similar.  It had  boo~ decided  that there  was  no  need  to  calcu-
late support in  the  EEC  for  tobacco,  vegetables,  fr1.1it,  wool  and  olive 
oil bocauGe  such  support is marginal.  It was  found  that public  inter-
vention  for  these  products is of secondary  importance  in  the  United 
States  too. 
The  final  results  do  not reveal  any  spectaculcr difference 
between  the  cituation in  the  EEC  and  the  United  States~ 4  1he  incidence 
of support  en  farm  inco~c is 50.4%  in tho  EEC  ~nd 44.3%  in  the  United 
Stn.tcs. 
The  difference. is sufficiently marked,  however,  to  allow  UG  to 
drn.w  sone  politico-economic  conclusions,  provided  a  further  check is 
made  on  the  fiGures. 
hll  these  comparisons  are  in fact  based  on  broad  findings.  When 
they arc  being  interpreted allowance  nust  be  m~de for  the  different 
methods  used  for  tho  United  Staten  ancl  the  EEC.  It might  be  useful 
to  examine  the8e  differences  product  by product. 
The  cGtimatcd  47.2%  drop  in  the  value  of wheat  producticn 
in  the  Ei.C  was  found  to  be  entirely  duo  to  the  price  p.:lid  for  home-
grown  wheat  being  brought  down  to  world  oarket level.  T~o world 
market price ic  very strongly influenced  by  the  US  (cupfortod)  price  • 
.  .  .  /.  "' . 
1  ~-5';~o 1  'f  11  .  ..- ~  l  a  ow::mce  :ts  made  for  the  reduction in food-grain prices. 
2  -
~f the  comparison  wcro 
wculd  bd  abcut  24%. 
based  on  world  market prices,  the  incidence 
3 
5~ only  i~ allowance  ic made  for  the  red~ction in food-grain prices. 
4 
52~ if cclculatiJns were  bused  o=  world  m~rket priceo !or milk  and 
mille  prc'du.cts, - 13  -
Tl~e  reduction in the  value  of  Hhe!tt  prod.uct:.on  in the  United  .S+,.:"ttes 
(estimuted ut  56o5%)  is  due  to  increased output  (becGuse  of  the  aboli-
tion of  for~er restrictions)  combined ·with  a  considerabl~ drop  in 
price. 
The  differenceo  between  the  methods  used  to  calculate  the  inci-
dence  in  the  ~EC and  the Unitod  StGte3  are  immediately obvious,  It 
·would  however  be  both  pointless and  impr<.:.cticablc  in this instance  to 
use  on2  and  the  same  methud. 
If  tho  incidence  of  support  on  farm  income  in  the  United  Stcteo 
wore  to  be  equated  uith the  difference  between  the  ~merican pric~ and 
the  world  mark8t price, it would  mean  that a  key  clement,  namely 
restrictions on production,  would be  overlooked  und  that  the  incidence 
would  be  largely underestimated. 
Similarly,  if the  incidence  of support on  farm  income  in the  EEC 
were  to  be  equat~d with  the  incidence  of purchases  on  the  market  and 
(non-existent)  restrictions on  production,  it would  mean  that the 
import  levy system  would  be  overlooked as  an  essential  f~ctor, lending 
to  a  further  gross underestimation. 
The  incidence  of  aid  for  whe~t in  the  EEC  could also  be  based  on 
the  reduced  American  price,  which  would  then be  very  clo~e to  the  new 
vorld price.  In  the  context of  u  short-ter~ analysis,  the  47~2% drop 
in  the  value  of production in  the  EEC  would,  strictly speaking,  still 
be  an  underestimation  because  the  reduction is in feet  based  on  a 
conparioon  with  a  world  market  price  whicih  is strongly influenced by 
the  suppcrted  ~merican price,  In the  medium  and  long  term,  following 
otabilization of output at a  lower  level in  the  United States and  the 
EEC  and  increased  demand  from  developing countries,  it is to  be 
expected  that  the  old price  would  still be  restored,  even if only 
partb.ll;_r. 
Much  the  same  line of argument  could  be  put  forward  for  feed 
grain. 
In  the  EEC  and  in  the  United States,  the  drop  in  tho  value  of 
production  (amounting  to  100~ and  79.6%  respectively)  can  be  attributed 
to  the  opening  up  of  frontiers  and  tho  abolition of  direct intervention 
on  the  market.  This  calculation can  only  be  based  on  suGar,  a 
processed  product 1  and  not  on  sugarbeot.  Tho  result obtained is 
h1ghcr  than  the  overall value  of  cugarb2ot  production.  The  income 
loss which  sugnrbe0t  growers  would  suffer if price  support  wore  with-
drawn  and  import  quotas  abolished  would  be  higher  than  their previous 
incomeo  It would  bo  im~ossible for  sugar manufacturers  to  p~ss tho 
full  burden  resulting  from  the  withdrawal  of  support  on  to  growers. 
Ncverthelccs  come  EEC  enterprises working  under  favourable  n~tural and 
structural conditions  would  be  able  to  go  on  growing  sugarbeet~  It 
would  be  un  cxnggorn~ion to  surccst thnt  this  crop  would  go  out  of 
production if supp0rt  were  withdrawn. (3)  Soya  bc3ns  olive oil and  cotton 
--~-------~---------------------
Soya  beans  and  cotton arc  grown  only in tho  United States and 
olive oil is produced  only in  the  ZEC.  This  in itself is sufficient 
inJication of  a  lack of uniformity in  the  methodology  used. 
For  olive oil  the  incidence  on  farm  income  was  calculated  on  the 
basis of  a  comparison  with  world  prices.  For  cotton  (the  world  price 
of  which  is on  the  same  level as  the  ..  mcricn.n  price)  nnd  soyo.  beans 
(the  world  pr~cc of  ~hich is  oq11nl  to  the  hmerico.n  price)  the  cnlculn-
tion  \'InS  based  on  the  presumed  effect of  the  ubolition of  restrictions 
on  supply  (for  cotton)  and  direct price  suppcrt  (for cotton and  soyo. 
bnc.ns). 
The  reduction in  the  value  of production of  beef,  veal  and 
pigment  in  the  E£C  (estimated at 38a7%  for  beef  and  veal  and  23.2% 
for  pigment)  would  be  a  short-term phenomenon  due  in the  main  to  the 
abolition of  levies  and  customs  duties. 
The  18vO%  reduction in  the  value  of total  meo.t  production in  the 
United States would  be  in  the  madium  tcrrn.  It is explained  by  an 
increase  in output  and  an  over-·compense.ting reduction in prices,  both 
due  to  more  widespread utilization of cheaper  feed  grnin.  The  result 
obtained is the  product of various  interdependent mathematical  values 
in  the  model  constr~cted by  Mayer,  Heady  and  Madsen. 
Since  the  incidence  of  US  aid is explained  by  the  isolation of 
the  internal market  2nd  by  the  co~siderable support  given  to  feed-
grain prices,  it should,  preferably,  be  c2lculated after several  years 
have  elapsed,  i~e.  in  tho  medium  term.,  The  effect of  a  reduction in 
feed-grain prices will  only  become  ap~nrent after a  number  of produc-
tion pe:;.·iods. 
By  contrast,  any  attempt  to  forecast  med!um-term  developments  on 
the  European  meat  market  is rather hazardous  because  allowance  hcs  to 
be  made  not  only  for  the  reduction  in  fecd-arain  prices and  the  adjuot-
mcnt  of  the  meat  price  to  world  ~nrl::et  condil.icn.c,  but  also  for  the 
spectacular  drop  in  the  price  of milk  productc  which  is  to  be  expected 
in the  short  ter~.  The  latter would  ceom  to  suggest  that  the  balance 
will ultimately tip in fnvour  of  increased neat production.  Indeed, 
in  the  medium  term,  u  stockbrceder  would  probably  suffer least loss of 
income  if he  wore  to  concentrate  on  beef  and  veal production despite 
less favourable  conditions  on  the  world  morkot.  Nevertheless,  it is 
hard  to  say  to  what  extent  this  increase  in  production  would  roduco 
prices  and  affect  income. 
Ecre  too,  then,  the  dynamic  method  chosen  for  the  United  Sk,tes 
and  static  one  used  for  the  EEC  was  merely  a  m~tter of pragmatism. 
When  the  incidence  on  pigmeat  in  the  E~C is being calculated, 
allowance  should  be  m.1.do  for  the  notes  to  Tnbler-:>  IV,  V nnd  VI  on  the 
effc::ct  of  o.  reduction in feed-grain  p.riccs.  Tlw  in-.::idcncc  on  tho 
vnluo  of production is actually calculated by  multiplyiug the  average 
levy  by  gross  domestic  production. - 15  -
This  result could  however  lend  to  the  wrong  conclusion.  To 
determine  the  real  income  effect of support  for  pigmeat production, 
lower  production costs attributable  to  cheaper  food  following  the 
reduction in  feed-gr~in prices  must  be  taken  into  account. 
To  incorporate  this factor  in  the  calculation,  production must  be 
multiplied,  not  by,  the  full levy,  but rather  by  the  "b"  clement of  the 
levy which  represents protection  for  the  pigme_at  industry. 
Tho  reduction in  the  value  of production of milk  and  milk 
products is put at 6lt.6%  for  the  EEC  and  4~5% for  the  United  States~ 
The  fieuro  for  the  E~C is undoubtedly  exaggerated.  The  enormous 
difference  between  the  import price of butter  (450  u.a.  per  ton)  and 
the  Community  threshold price  (1  873.6  u~a.  per  ton)  is not only due 
to  the  isolation of the  EEC  market  but  also  to  the  considerable  export 
subsidies  granted  by  non-member  countries. 
The  suspicion that  the  figure  of  64.6% is excessive  is partly 
confirmed  by  comparing  the  average  producer  price  for  whole  milk in 
the  EEC  (in 1967/68,  9.54 u.a./100 kg  of milk with  a  3.7%  fat content) 
and  the  average  producer price  for  the  same  product  in  hust~alia,  New 
Zenland 1  Ireland and  Denmark  C±  $6/100 kg).  However,  too  much 
importance  cannot  be  attached  to  the  comparison~  The  price quoted 
for  these  countries is a  supported  one  and  in any  event  the  EEC  does 
not  import  whole  milk.  For  this  reason,  the  import price  of butter 
is much  more  significant  than  the  average  producer price  for  whole 
r.Jilk., 
There  i.s  a  more  serious objection,  however.  The  apparent  gap 
between prices is  so  wide  that if support  were  withdrawn  a  substantial 
reduction in  the  dairy  cow  population and  increased  emphasis  on  meat 
production  ~ight be  exp~ctcd even  in  the  short  termu  For  this reason 
it would  be  better  to  view  the  calculation of incidence  from  the 
dynamic  an£;1Co 
By  contrast  the  L~~5% reduction  in  the  value  of production  in  the 
United States is an  underestimation~  The  calculation is based  on  the 
nssumption  tb  w. t  the  "marketing orders"  system  introduced by  the  Sta  bw 
will remain  unchanged  and  that  import  quotas  (which  arc  undeniably a 
form  of  support)  will not  be  abolished.  If the  calculation  were 
based  on  the  diocrepancy  between  the  American  price and  the  world 
price,  tha  reduction would  be  2ir.,l%. 
The  results indicate  that  tho  withdrawal  of support  would 
lead to  a  15.2% reduction  in  the  value  of  egg  and  poultrymeat produc-
tion in  tho  EEC  but  would  have  no  effect on  the  value  of production 
in the  United States. - 16  -
The.reduction for  the  EEC  would  follow  the  adjustment  of  domes-
tic prices  to  the.lev8l of  world  prices.  World  prices are,  in turn, 
strongly influenced  by  conditions  on  the  ..  n1erican  market.  For  this 
reason it was  assuwed  that  the  vnlue  of  ~merican production  would 
remain  constant,  If allowance  is  made  in  the  case  of the  EEC  for 
the  incidence  of  the  reduction in feed-grain prices,  the  income 
effect becomes  5%. 
It is clear  that  most  of  the  difficulties encountered in inter-
preting  the  findings  of  this study are  dua  t6  the  different method-
ological  approaches  on  which  the  calculations are  based.  The  compari-
son of results is hampered  by  tho  fact  U1at  the  analysis  for  the  EEC 
is static  (i.e.  the  vc~me of production  was  considered  to  be  invariable 
in relation  to  price  decreases  in  the  short  term)  whereas  this restric-
tive  hypothesis  was  not  retained  for  tho  United States. 
One  of  tho  direct consequences of  the  aasumption  that  the  volume 
of production in  the  United  States is variable is  that production costs 
also  become  variable.  In  this  connection,  Mayer,  Heady  and  Madsen 
found  that purchases  of  inputs  from  outside agriculture  fella  This 
decrease  is to  be  deducted  from  the  overall incidence  of aid. 
The  value  of purchases  of  inputs  from  outside  agriculture  remains 
constant in  the  EEC,  with  the  sole  exception of  the  reduction in  the 
value  of  feed  grain purchased  on  the  market  or  imported  from  non-member 
countries. 
hnother restriction,  this  time  affecting  the  method  applied  to  the 
United States,  is  the  closed character of  th~  model  used  by  Mayer, 
Hendy  and  Madson.  Unlike  the  method  followed  for  the  EEC,  it was 
assumed  that  import restrictiuns  would  be  mnint~ined. 
For  certain products  - and  this is  p~rticulnrly true of  milk  and 
milk  products  - quantitative restrictions on  imports  are  in fact  an 
instrument  of  support policy. 
Except  where  allowance  has  already been  made  for  this in  the 
corrections,  it should  be  remembered  that the  study rests  on  the 
following  basic  hypotheses: 
(1)  It is  assu!"!led  that  economic  interdependence  hns,  at least for 
thu  purpose  of  a  short-term analysis  and  for  the  EEC,  a 
negligible  effect on  the  validity of  the  findings.  The  errors 
flowing  from  this  assumption  will  be  minimal  in comparison  to 
tte  margin  between  EEC  and  world  prices.  The  phenomenon  of 
interdependence  applies  both  to  the  relationship  between  domestic 
and  world  prices  and  to  the  relationship  between  domestic  prices 
for  various  farm  products. - 17 -
(2)  The  incidence of aid to agriculture in  the  EEC  was  calculated 
on  the  assumption  that  the United  States  would  maintain its 
support policy.  Similarly,  the  incidence  of aid  to  agriculture 
in  the  United States was  calculated  on  the assumption  that  the 
Community  would  maint~in its market  intervention policy.  In 
both  cases it was  assumed  that agricultural support policies 
would  be  maintained in other countries  too. 
(3)  Calculations  were  only made  for  measures  of  support  with  a 
"direct"  incidence  on  income. 
(1)  The  findings  of  the  study indicate  that if direct agricultural 
support  were  withdrawn,  farm  income  in  the  United  States would  decline 
by  about  44%1  and  farm  income  in the  EEC·by  about 50%.  Expressed  in 
terms  of  dollars per  annum  and  per labour unit,  these  percentages 
represent  n  reduc~ion of  some  $1  320  for  the United States nnd  some 
$860  for  the  EEC~ 
(2)  The  overall results also  show  that support  in the United  States 
is essentially linked  to  products.  ·  Wheat,  fodder  beet,  soya  beans, 
sugarbect,  and  sugar  cane  arc  the  crops  which  receive  the  heaviest 
support.  Support  for  livestock products is more  indirect  and  in any 
event less extensive  than  that for  crop products.  Support in the 
EEC  is,in the  main,linkcd  to  products;  only  5%  of all support is 
linked  to  inputs  and  income.  In contrast  to  the  situation in the 
United States,  livestock products receive  the  bulk of all support in 
the  EEC.  -
In  the  Community,  27%  of product-linked aid goes  to  crop  products 
and  73%  to  liveGtock products;  the  corresponding  figures  for  the 
United Sta  tcs arc  65%  and  35~~- The  withdrawal  of  s:.lpport  would  lead 
to  a  fall of 19%  in  the  value  of  crop production in  the  EEC  and  28%  in 
the  United  States.  The  value  of livestock production  would  fall  by 
38%  in the  EEC  and  13%  in  the  United  Sta.tes. 
(3)  There  are  grounds  for  believing that  the  incidence of aid in  the 
EEC  has  been  underestimated  for  wheat  and  feed  grain,  and  overestimated 
for  sugur,  milk  and  milk  products. 
On  the  other hand,  it is more  than likely that  the  results  for 
milk  and  milk products  for  the  United States are  an  underestimation. 
The  incidence of  support  on  sugar  and  cereals  may  be  slightly 
overcstimnted. 
ec.e/••• 
1  52%  if calculations  were  based  on  world prices  for  milk  and  milk 
products. 
2 
Th~ labour  figures  were  tak:n  ~ro'TI  US?;•,- f~~~ultuE£..12};.::J.tis~i~!l 
l9.o8 1  p.446  and  SOEC  - §1at~st1~~ene~~  1969,  No.  11,  p~l8. - 13  -
(4)  These  considerations  ouggest  that  the  initial  discrP.pancy  between 
the  reduction  in  farm  income  in  the  United States  (44%)  and  the  EEC 
(50%)  does  not  entirely reflect  the  real situation and  that  the 
discrcp~ncy is probably less  ~nrked in  fact.  It is clear 1  moreover, 
that  the  correctiGns  made  bring not  only  the  overall  results but'aloo 
tbe  percentage  incidence  of  the  various  constituent elements  of  income 
closer  together~ 